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RECENT CASES
therefore should have the supremacy afforded Federal law.6 Realizing
the difficulties which will arise in a confusion of state decisions on
the problem, the Federal government has intervened in the Karlinski
ca"se.
7
The confusion in Washington as to government savings bonds
has now fortunately been clarified by the legislature. An act affirming
the beneficiary's rights was passed in the 1943 session. It provides:
"§ 1: If either co-owner of United States Savings Bonds
registered in two names as co-owners (in the alternative) dies
without having presented and surrendered the bond for pay-
ment to a Federal Reserve Bank or the Treasury Department,
the surviving co-owner will be the sole and absolute owner of
the bond.
"§ 2: If the registered owner of United States Savings
Bonds registered in the name of one person payable on death
to another dies without having presented and surrendered the
bond for payment or authorized re-issue to a Federal Reserve
Bank or Treasury Department, and is survived by the bene-
ifciary, the beneficiary will be the sole and absolute owner
of the bond."
Although this enactment has solved the problem as to government
bonds, the rights of beneficiaries of life insurance policies and savings
deposit trusts are still uncertain.9 It is necessary to recognize a con-
tract relation in the Decker case, as the court did in the Iver and Lewis
cases in order to have a clear precedent for further cases involving
the rights of contract beneficiaries. 10
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RECENT CASES
SALES TAX-APPIaCAB5rrY TO CoarrmoNAL SALES. Held: Where property
sold under a conditional sales contract is repossessed by the vendor after
part payment, the sales tax is to be computed on the full amount of the
sale, and is not limited to the amounts actually collected thereunder. The
sales tax is payable on the full consideration, and money, credits, rights
or chattel given as part of the purchase price are not exempt from the
tax. Olympic Motors v. McCroslcej, 115 Wash. Dec. 562, 132 P. (2d) 355
(1942).
Plaintiff sold motor vehicles on conditional sales contracts, under which
it repossessed a number of them. In making its regular report to the
state tax commission, plaintiff paid the sales tax upon the amount of the
conditional sales after deducting therefrom the unpaid balances due upon
the conditional sales contracts under which it had repossessed vehicles.
6As to 'the policy favoring supremacy of Federal obligations, see:
Franklin Washington Trust Co. v. Beltram, op. cit. supra, n. 5; Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 63 Sup. Ct. 573 (1943): Federal common law
determined liability of endorser of treasury check; Gulf Oil Co. v. Lastrap,
48 F. Supp. 947 (S. D., Tex. 1943): beneficiary allowed to recover in in-
surance policy though he had no insurable interest by state law.
'7Rhearing, In re Karlinski's Estate, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 22 (March, 1943).
8 Ch. 14, SEssioN LAWS, 1943,
DVance, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930), p. 545; 14 WASH. LAW Puv. 312, n. 2,
op. cit., supra, n. 2; 1 Scott, TRUSTS (1939), § 58.3; 56 HARV. LAW PuV. 1007
(May, 1943).
S10Op. cit., sLpra, n. 3.
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The tax commission threatened to collect this amount by distraint, under
tax commission rule 203, authorized by Laws of 1935, chapter 180, pg. 844,
Sec. 208, which reads: . . . "No deduction for credit losses in case of
repossession is allowed under -the Retail Sales Tax or Compensating Tax."
Plaintiff brought this action to restrain the tax commission on the
theory that the rule was void, and was not authorized by the provisions
of the above law. McCroskey case, supra.
The court unequivocally rejected plaintiff's theory, and sustained
the rule and its application. It held that the statute was clear and
unambiguous, and that there was no need for interpretation or construction,
as was suggested by the plaintiff. The statute specifically provides that
the tax should be collected on-the selling price of the article sold without
any deductions on account of losses, which would include the repossession
of goods sold under conditional sales contracts.
The selling price is the consideration, whether expressed in terms of
money or money's wonth. The legislature provided that credits and
rights also constitute a basis for the computation of the tax if they are
a part of the consideration involved in the sale. It was specifically provided
that the fact of failure of collection from the vendee is not material, and
that the vendor is none the less responsible for the tax. "Conditional
sale" was defined in the act to be included in the meaning of "sale".
This decision appears to be the first on this subject in this state. There
are few decisions elsewhere on this point, as the sales tax on retail sales
has only been used by the majority of states during the past two decades.
The decision in the instant case, however, is in line with existing uniform
authority on the subject. In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Fry, 277 Mich.
260, 269 N. W. 166 (1936), the court in construing a sales tax statute almost
identical to Washington's decided as did our court above. It held that
the sales tax enacted for articles sold under conditional sales contracts
could not be refunded because of repossession by the vendor of merchan-
dise conditionally sold. This case was sustained by the Michigan court in
two subsequent cases, Wurlitzer v. State Board of Tax Administration,
281 Mich. 558, 275 N. W. 248 (1937); and Gardner-White Co. v. Dunckel,
296 Mich. 225, 295 N. W. 624 (1941).
The Washington court is also supported by virtually uncontested author-
ity in its holding that the sales tax is payable on the consideration, whether
it be money, credits, rights or other property. This includes, as in the
instant case, a used car turned in by the vendee as part payment on
another one. The cases cited above are directly in point and accord with
this view.
The Illinois court in interpreting their statute, which is very similar
to ours, agrees with the foregoing decisions. It held that the value of
property traded in by the purchaser on a reconditioned motor sold by the
vendor-taxpayer was part of the selling price within the provisions of
the statute. Warshavsky & Co. v. Dept. of Finance, 377 Ill. 165, 36 N. E.
(2d) 233 (1941). Also in point are Bigsby v. Johnson, 99 P. (2d) 268 (1941),
on rehearing, 18 Cal. (2d) 860, 118 P. (2d) 289; and State v. Hallenberg-
Wagner Motor Co., 341 Mo. 771, 108 S. W. (2d) 398 (1937). The latter case
cited the following cases, which support the above. Thomas Auto Co. v.
Wiseman, 192 Ark. 584, 93 S. W. (2d) 138 (1936); State v. Bachus Chevrolet
Co., 170 Md. 309, 184 A. 160 (1936); McCanless Motor Co. v. Maxwell, 210
N. C. 725, 188 S. E. 389 (1936). Accord, see an earlier case, Carter v. Slavik
Jewelry Co., 26 F. (2d) 571, 58 A. L. R. 1043 (1928).
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